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TRUSTS AND ESTATES
I. RENUNCIATION OF LIFE ESTATE CLOSES CLASS OF REMAINDERMEN
AND ACCELERATES POSSESSION OF REMAINDER INTEREST
In Pate v. Ford' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
South Carolina disclaimer statute2 requires a testator to provide ex-
pressly for an alternative disposition of his bequeaths if the testator
desires to avoid acceleration of a remainder interest following a dis-
claimed life estate.3 Thus, the court rescued the substantive effect of
the state legislation governing disclaimers of property interests. The
result under the statute remains the same even if the remainder would
have been subject to partial divestment during the life estate.4
Alethea Pate died on October 21, 1983, leaving an estate valued at
roughly 6.78 million dollars. Mrs. Pate's husband, William Pate, Sr.
died in 1979. Mrs. Pate had two children, William Pate, Jr. (Billy) and
Wallace Pate (Wallace), both of whom survived her. Billy had no chil-
dren at the time of Mrs. Pate's death, and Wallace had five children,
all adults.'
The dispute in Pate arose out of the distribution of a one-third
share of the estate.' Mrs. Pate's will directed the administrator to
place the share in trust with Wallace as the life beneficiary. "On Wal-
lace's death," the share was to be distributed "in equal shares per stir-
pes" to Mrs. Pate's natural born grandchildren. 7 Wallace subsequently
1. 297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
2. At the time the Pate controversy arose, South Carolina Code section 21-37-50
controlled the passage of disclaimed property interests. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-37-50
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1987). The new Probate Code repealed and super-
seded this section in 1987. See id. §§ 62-1-100 to -603 (Law Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1989).
A Probate Code provision similar to old section 21-3.7-50 is found in section 62-2-801.
See id. § 62-2-801. Because the wording of the two statutes is comparable, the Pate
decision also applies to the new statute. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
3. 297 S.C. at 298, 376 S.E.2d at 777.
4. See id.
5. Pate v. Ford, 293 S.C. 268, 272-73, 360 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd,
297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
6. Id. at 274, 280, 360 S.E.2d at 149, 152.
7. Pate, 297 S.C. at 296, 376 S.E.2d at 776. The court of appeals determined that
the term "in equal shares per stirpes" meant that grandchildren from all branches of the
family would take equally, with the predeceased grandchild taking his ancestor's share
by representation. Pate, 293 S.C. at 276-78, 360 S.E.2d at 150-52. The supreme court did
not review this issue.
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disclaimed all of his interest in the estate.' He assumed that South
Carolina Code section 21-37-50(a) of the disclaimer statute would ac-
celerate his children's remainder interest.9 In this way, Wallace hoped
to pass a gift to his children without the imposition of a large gift tax. °
Billy Pate and several guardians ad litem challenged the validity of the
disclaimer.11
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Master in Eq-
uity's ruling and held that the disclaimer would not accelerate posses-
sion of the remainder in this case.12 The court of appeals stated that
when the remaindermen are known at the time of the disclaimer, accel-
eration will occur. If, however, the remaindermen are to be determined
on the death of the life beneficiary, acceleration will result in "the
rights of unborn remaindermen [that are] injuriously affected."' 3
Because Mrs. Pate's will granted the.remainder to grandchildren
generally, and not to Wallace's children as individuals, the court of ap-
peals reasoned that Mrs. Pate intended to include after-born
grandchildren.14 The court, therefore, ruled that allowing acceleration
8. Pate, 297 S.C. at 296, 376 S.E.2d at 776 (supreme court opinion).
9. Id. Section 21-37-50(a) provided:
If a person becomes entitled to an interest in property because of the
death of a decedent including, but not limited to, a testator, an intestate, an
insured, the grantor of a trust, the holder of a power of appointment, a joint
owner with right of survivorship, and a participant in a retirement plan and
the person disclaims the interest, the interest devolves or passes as if the
person predeceased the decedent, unless the instrument governing the dev-
olution or passing of the interest contains another disposition thereof in
the event of a disclaimer; provided, that in no event may § 21-7-470 govern
the devolution or passing of any interest in property disclaimed herein. Any
future interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment after the termi-
nation of the estate disclaimed takes effect as if the person disclaiming had
died before the event determining that the taker of the property or interest
had become finally ascertained and his interest indefeasibly vested. A dis-
claimer relates back for all purposes to the date of death of the decedent or
donee of the power, or insured, or qualified plan participant, or the determi-
native event, as the case may be.
S.C, CODE ANN. § 21-37-50(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1987) (emphasis
added).
10. The gift tax would have been "no less than $116,713.00." Brief of Petitioner to
the Court of Appeals at 20-21.
11. Billy, also an executor of the estate, attacked the disclaimer in only an indi-
vidual capacity. See Record at 365-66. Four guardians ad litem, who represented the
interests of various minors and classes of unborn potential beneficiaries, challenged the
disclaimer. Id. at 378, 386, 395, 397.
12. Pate v. Ford, 293 S.C. 268, 281, 360 S.E.2d 145, 153 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 297
S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 275, 282, 360 S.E.2d at 150, 153.
[Vol. 42
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in this case would permit Wallace "to defeat the intent of the testatrix
by the unilateral act of disclaiming his life interest."15
The disclaimer statute at issue in Pate stated that a disclaimer
causes the renounced interest to pass as if the disclaimant predeceased
the testator "unless the instrument governing the devolution or passing
of the interest contains another disposition thereof' in the event of a
disclaimer ... .""1 The appellate court held that the statute did not
require acceleration.' 7 Because the assets of the life estate were to be
distributed on Wallace's death, the court of appeals reasoned that the
will "prevent[ed] the remainder interest from being distributed until
Wallace die[d], even if he disclaim[ed] his life interest."' 8 Therefore,
the court of appeals found that "in the language of the statute, the
instrument governing devolution contains 'another disposition' of the
remainder interest in the event of a disclaimer. For this reason, the
statute, by its own terms, does not accelerate the remainder."'"
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
The supreme court held that the will did not contain "another disposi-
tion" within the meaning of the statute.20 The court stated that the
term "[o]n Wallace's death" simply indicated that the will granted
Wallace a life estate. The court further explained that "another dispo-
sition" means an alternate disposition. In other words, "Mrs. Pate
would have had to provide for something else to happen to the interest
between the time Wallace disclaimed and the time the interest de-
volved to [the grandchildren]."'2 1 Because the will did not contain this
type of alternate disposition, the remainder accelerated possession of
the life estate for Wallace's children.
22
South Carolina common law historically has recognized disclaimers
of testamentary gifts, when made properly and in a timely fashion.23
Furthermore, South Carolina courts would accelerate possession of
vested future interests if the interests followed the failure of a prior
15. Id. at 281-82, 360 S.E.2d at 153.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-37-50(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1987).
17. Pate v. Ford, 293 S.C. 268, 283, 360 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 297
S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
18. Id. at 282-83, 360 S.E.2d at 154.
19. Id. at 283, 360 S.E.2d at 154.
20. Pate, 297 S.C. at 298, 376 S.E.2d at 777. A second issue addressed by the
supreme court was a provision in the will granting Wallace's children an option to
purchase the estate homeplace at the "appraised value." The court held that "appraised
value" is the value at the time of Mrs. Pate's death, not the value at the time of
purchase. See id. at 298-300, 376 S.E.2d at 777-78.
21. Id. at 298, 376 S.E.2d at 777.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Bahan v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 267 S.C. 303, 308-10, 227 S.E.2d
671, 673-74 (1976); Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 515, 93 S.E.2d 918, 925-26 (1956).
1990]
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estate.2' When future interests were granted to a class, however, as in
Pate, the law has not been as clear. The Restatement of Property
states that acceleration should occur absent other facts to indicate the
testator's contrary intent.2 5 Some courts, however, have presumed that
the testator would not have intended acceleration.26
In 1983 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the dis-
claimer statute at issue in Pate "to clarify the laws of this State with
respect to [disclaimers] in order to ensure the ability of persons to dis-
claim interests in property without the imposition of federal and state
estate, inheritance, gift, and transfer taxes. '27 The language of the stat-
ute mandates acceleration of any future interest without regard for the
testator's intent, unless the testator provides "another disposition" of
the disclaimed interest.28 In finding "another disposition," the court of
appeals was able to ignore the statute.29 In spite of the disclaimer stat-
ute, the court of appeals presumed Mrs. Pate's intent and rendered an
equitable decision. If the supreme court had allowed the court of ap-
peals' decision to stand, however, the passage of the statute would have
had little effect on the law of disclaimers in South Carolina. No evi-
dence discloses that the legislature contemplated such an
interpretation."
The disclaimer statute debated in Pate is no longer the law be-
cause section 62-2-801 of the South Carolina Probate Code has super-
24. See, e.g., Key v. Weathersbee, 43 S.C. 414, 423-25, 21 S.E. 324, 327-28 (1895).
25. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 231 comment i (1936).
26. See, e.g., Walsh v. Hulse, 23 N.J. Super. 573, 578, 93 A.2d 230, 233 (1952). The
"testator will be presumed to have intended to give the property in remainder from and
after the termination of the preceding estate in the absence of some controlling equity or
express or clearly implied provision in the will to the contrary . . . ." Id. (emphasis
added); Keesler v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 256 N.C. 12, 18-20, 122 S.E.2d 807, 813
(1961); Neill v. Bach, 231 N.C. 391, 394-95, 57 S.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1950).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-37-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1987).
28. See id. § 21-37-50(a). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29. The court of appeals stated, "The statute was enacted solely to alter the tax
consequences of disclaimers of interest and is clearly subject to the qualifications that if
the testator intends a different disposition, the testator's intent, not the statute, governs
devolution." Pate v. Ford, 293 S.C. 268, 282 n.1, 360 S.E.2d 145, 154 n.1 (Ct. App. 1987),
rev'd, 297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989). This footnote indicates that the court of ap-
peals was prepared to go to substantial lengths to circumvent the statutory language. See
also Stewart v. Johnson, 88 N.C. App. 277, 278-79, 362 S.E.2d 849 (1987) (disclaimer
statute did not require acceleration of future interest), cert. denied, 323 N.C. 179, 373
S.E.2d 124 (1988).
30. The legislature's statement about taxes in section 21-37-10 arguably is nothing
more than a truism: Most people disclaim property interest because of taxes. See UNI-
FORM DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT AcT § 3, 8A U.L.A.
102 (1983) and the comments following.
[Vol. 42
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seded it.3 Because the language is similar, 2 however, the legal effect of
the new statute should be the same as the one it replaced. In fact, the
issue in Pate may not have arisen under the new statute because accel-
eration is required "[u]nless the transferor has provided otherwise
... ."3 The legislature's intent now is seemingly less obscure.
In Pate v. Ford the supreme court restored the substantive effect
of the state's disclaimer legislation. The decision leaves drafters with a
clear message: if acceleration of a future interest in the event of a dis-
claimer is not desired, the will must state explicitly what is to happen
to the interest in the meantime.
Craig N. Killen
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-801 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1989).
32. Section 62-2-801(d) provides:
Unless the transferor has provided otherwise in the event of a disclaimer,
the disclaimed interest shall be transferred (or fail to be transferred, as the
case may be) as if the disclaimant had predeceased the date of effectiveness of
the transfer of the interest; the disclaimer shall relate back to that date of
effectiveness for all purposes; and any future interest which is provided to
take effect in possession or enjoyment after the termination of the disclaimed
interest shall take effect as if the disclaimant had predeceased the date on
which he or she as the taker of the disclaimed interest became finally ascer-
tained and the disclaimed interest became indefeasibly vested; provided, that
an interest disclaimed by a disclaimant who is the spouse of a decedent, the
transferor of the interest, may pass by any further process of transfer to such
spouse, notwithstanding the treatment of the transfer of the disclaimed inter-
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